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Abstract: 
This article interrogates the spectre of resistance in the writings of Giorgio 
Agamben and Michel Foucault, arguing they open up divergent ways of 
theorizing resistance to power. This article’s focus is on both philosophers use and 
interpretation of the dispositif, or apparatus, which controls and orders subjects, 
and which is the target for forms of resistance. Whereas for Foucault resistance is 
a practice existing as a transcendent possibility for any individual, Agamben reads 
such transcendent forms of resistance as ultimately reinforcing the control of the 
dispositif, arguing that only a turn to ontology and immanent politics can 
resistance be meaningful.  
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Both Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben have written extensively on ‘life’ in 
its various guises, and how it has been controlled and ordered by power. This 
article engages with the thought of Foucault and Agamben and focuses on their 
work on resistance. It reads both as offering different constructions to the concept 
of the individual, which is also termed the singularity, or life itself. These 
differences, which are related to one another, offer contrasting approaches to 
theorizing life, and ultimately illustrate how the individual can resist apparatuses 
of control.  
 In undertaking these readings, this article engages with the relationship 
between the work of Agamben and Foucault, and particularly the question of 
intellectual patrimony which may exist in Agamben’s work, using Agamben’s 
reading of Foucault as a starting point. To enter into debates about the history of 
philosophy and focus upon a thinker’s influences, particularly a specific influence 
such as Foucault, can be a fraught affair. For instance, Agamben has openly 
admitted being influenced by the writings of Hannah Arendt,1 and studied under 
Heidegger at Le Thor.2 It may be not seem immediately clear why such a focus on 
Foucault, and not say Heidegger or Arendt, is necessary, especially when much 
existing scholarship already focuses on the fact that many of Agamben’s works 
owe a large debt to Foucault.  
 However, I contend that if Agamben’s thought is conflated too readily 
with Foucault’s, as much scholarship has done, then the different perspective 
Agamben provides on the nature of resistance, through his reading of Foucault 
and the dispositif, is in danger of being effaced, or worse, missed.  
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 This paper focuses on the apparatus, or dispositif. The dispositif represents 
the network of power relations which articulates how a power not based upon 
classical conceptions of sovereignty manifests itself, and is a key term in 
Foucault’s thought. It is through the dispositif that the human being is transformed 
into both a subject, and an object, of power relations.3 Agamben also focuses upon 
the dispositif, and specifically how it operates as an apparatus to control humanity.  
 In analyzing their use of the dispositif, Foucault and Agamben are read as 
offering two distinct approaches for conceiving of freeing life from the binds of 
oppressive social structures. Foucault seeks the potential for an ethical and 
aesthetic self-creation in the emergence of the new, be it a form of power, 
counter-conduct or an ethical culture of the self.4 As part of this move, Foucault 
relies upon transcendent referents which are utilized to ground a new form of 
freedom for the individual. In contrast, Agamben eschews all reference to 
transcendence, contending that politics involves the deactivation of all dispositifs, 
opening up an immanent sphere of radical indifference for life to dwell in. 
Clarifying the relation between Foucault and Agamben sets the stage for better 
appreciating their different forms of emancipatory politics. 
 
I. A non-Foucauldian philosopher? 
Interest in Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy has grown exponentially since the 
various volumes of Agamben’s Homo Sacer project have been published.5 
Agamben’s major engagement with Foucault begins at the very start of Homo 
Sacer I,6 with his aim to “correct, or at least complete” Foucault’s hypothesis of 
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biopower.7 Roberto Esposito correctly notes that Foucault did not invent the idea 
of biopolitics, as its origins can be traced to the early twentieth century.8 
However, in distinction to these earlier notions, which saw biopolitics as a direct 
relation between biological life and politics, biopolitics for Foucault was part of a 
much larger analysis of governmentality.9 For Foucault, biopower refers to the 
techniques of government which transform life into an element of the economy of 
power. Biopower focuses on disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms designed 
to transform and influence human life, to optimize health and prolong life.10 In 
other words, biopower strives to preserve life, even at the cost of terrible 
suffering.11 Importantly, as well as the government of the living, biopower refers 
to the multiple practices of dying. Death is the limit to biopower for Foucault, 
because power must invest itself in the body.  
 Agamben deems his ‘correction’ as necessary due to his reading a ‘failure’ 
on Foucault’s part to connect his analyses of biopower to Arendt’s studies on 
totalitarianism, which prevented him from developing his nascent concept of 
biopolitics.12 He reads Foucault’s works as being comprised of two main strands 
of inquiry. The first is that of biopower and biopolitics, and the second refers to 
the examination of technologies of the self or disciplinary power.13 Agamben’s 
key move is to argue that Foucault failed to identify the point at which these two 
powers converged, and that this ‘hidden point of intersection’ is not an 
intersection at all, as the two strands are bound together through sovereign power 
– a sovereign power which maintains the right of death over the individual.14  
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 As such, Agamben’s crucial move is to claim that death is not power’s 
limit, but rather the terrain upon which power operates.15 While Foucault wrote of 
the deadly combination of biopower and sovereign power, which was exemplified 
in Nazi Germany,16 Agamben reads this combination not as a historical 
aberration, but as a condition of possibility of Western politics. Agamben thus 
inverts Foucault’s statement that “death is outside the power relationship” and 
“beyond the reach of power”;17 biopolitics is much more about sovereignty and 
death than Foucault contends.  
 Even here though, it is necessary to note that Agamben’s interpretation of 
biopower is not as far removed from Foucault as first appears. Despite Foucault’s 
pronouncements on the relationship between death and power, there is nothing 
about Foucault’s account that precludes a discrimination between lives that are 
worth living and lives that are not worth living, as long as this discrimination is 
understood to enhance the population’s productivity.18 What biopolitical practices 
and strategies entail is not just the ability to foster life, but also allow life to die.19 
This means that the death of any particular individual is insignificant, as life 
continues at the level of the population.20 Indeed, Timothy Campbell has gone so 
far as to claim that much contemporary writing on biopolitics, including 
Agamben, Esposito and Peter Sloterdijk retain a preoccupation with how 
biopolitics regulates death, leading to biopolitics being reduced to a form of 
thanatopolitics.21 
 The orthodox view is that biopower occupies a transitory moment in 
Foucault’s thought, as it was not a refined enough category of power for his 
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analyses. This is the reason why governmentality and dispositifs of security began 
to enter Foucault’s work.22 However, Mitchell Dean has noted that sovereignty 
still plays a role in Foucault’s thought, for example in his referring to the nature of 
a coup d’état.23 In addition, Foucault does conflate biopower and 
governmentality, claiming the state of government is defined by the “mass of 
population”. He then makes clear that while governmentality is pre-eminent in 
modernity, it does not displace sovereign power.24 This should be understood 
despite the fact that Foucault’s hypothesis of biopower took him towards his later 
analyses of the subject and subjectivity, which accords with Foucault’s own claim 
that the subject was the overriding theme of his work.25  
 Perhaps not unreasonably, given these claims, and Agamben’s own 
statement that he sees his work as “closer to no one than to Foucault”,26 a great 
deal of the literature reads his thought through the lens of Foucault. There is much 
merit in scholarship investigating the differences and divergences between 
philosophers. However, this scholarship reads Agamben as an heir to Foucault’s 
philosophical project. Perhaps this is why he has been accused of constructing a 
blunt account, conflating biopower with a politics of death, and ignoring the 
nuances in Foucault’s thought.27  
 Katia Genel, as part of a detailed analysis of Agamben’s ‘correction’ of 
Foucault, asks whether Agamben could “legitimately reinterpret” Foucault’s 
thought in the way he does.28 Questioning whether Agamben has undertaken a 
‘legitimate reinterpretation’ implies that Agamben has directly developed 
Foucault’s thought. Genel, not without reason, concludes that “Agamben carries 
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out a displacement of his interrogation onto the terrain of sovereignty and the law, 
a terrain Foucault had abandoned”.29 Mika Ojakangas has argued that Agamben’s 
move to ally biopower with sovereignty misses a key thrust of Foucault’s 
analysis: 
The original problem of Agamben’s analysis is that he sees bio‐power as 
power based upon bare life, defined in turn solely by its capacity to be 
killed. Foucault’s bio‐power has nothing to do with that kind of bare 
life.30  
 
Both Genel and Ojakangas read Agamben’s thought as a continuation or 
descendant of Foucault’s philosophical project, and as such demands a certain 
‘fidelity’ to Foucault. The criticisms they level at the accuracy of Agamben’s 
‘corrections’ are supported by the knowledge that, for Foucault, biopower is a 
thoroughly modern phenomenon.31 For Agamben, biopower is not modern at all, 
but has existed since the time of Aristotle.32  
 If Agamben’s thought was part of a Foucauldian co-ordinate, these points 
would be unimpeachable. However, this article constructs an alternative reading 
of Agamben’s thought, involving the appropriation of Foucauldian concepts to 
forward a different conception of political existence and resistance, based upon 
both a novel reading of Foucault and an interrogation into the nature of ‘life’ 
itself.33 Following Michael Dillon, I wish to inquire not into “the degree of 
faithlessness” Agamben shows to Foucault, but as to “the worth of the betrayal”.34 
It is through this questioning that Agamben allows us to explore the potential in 
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his work, and the work of Foucault, for new forms of living that break free of 
contemporary structures of domination. 
 
II. Immanent Life, and the Challenge of Transcendence 
In his essay ‘Absolute Immanence’, with a typical rhetorical flourish, Agamben 
maps modern post-Kantian philosophy, dividing it between two lines depending 
upon how it thinks life. Firstly, the line of transcendence, beginning with Kant and 
ending in Derrida and Levinas. Secondly, the line of immanence, beginning with 
Spinoza, travelling via Nietzsche, and ending with Deleuze and Foucault.35 It is 
this immanent vision of life which Agamben seeks to explore, thinking against the 
nihilistic consequences of holding immanence in relation to transcendence. 
Agamben explains that this recourse to transcendence is not necessarily 
deliberate: 
[I]mmanence is not merely threatened by this illusion of transcendence, in 
which it is made to leave itself and give birth to the transcendent. This 
illusion is, rather, something like a necessary illusion … to which every 
philosopher falls prey even as he tries to adhere as closely as possible to 
the plane of immanence.36 
 
Agamben views Foucault’s ideas of life and resistance being led astray by the 
promise of transcendence. Before continuing, it is worth summarizing exactly 
what the dangers of transcendence are for Agamben. This should be read in 
conjunction with his reading of the close relationship between biopower and 
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death. His argument centres upon a controversial reading of Aristotle’s Politics, 
and a claim that the Greeks did not have one word for life, but two.37 Zoē 
expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings; bios referred to 
‘political life’, a way of living proper to man, which can be read here as a 
transcendent referent.38  
 Here I rely on Agamben’s use of the ban, which indicates that the meaning 
of x is produced by its being held in relation to a non-x.39 Both bios and zoē exist 
in this functional relation. Life, and political life in particular, is not defined 
immanently by itself, but is defined through its being held in relation to ‘natural 
life’, what it is not, mere existence, zoē, which exists as a universal transcendent 
referent.40 Political life is qualified, the mere fact of living is universal.  
 Political life is therefore defined in a negative functional relation; life is 
not defined by what it is, but by being held in relation to what it is not, natural 
life. It is this negative relationality that Agamben sees as underpinning modern 
political existence. For Agamben, politics is the place in which a universal natural 
life, zoē, had to be transformed into a qualified political life, bios.41  
 However, the impact of this relation of ban is that bios can only gain 
meaning when held in relation to what it is not. Therefore zoē is not completely 
subsumed and transformed into bios, but instead continues to exist. This zoē 
remains in the political order, existing as politicized zoē, or bare life. The 
implications of this are that individuals will be de-subjectified, become 
expendable and be killed with impunity in any political order, because creating 
leads to the biopolitical creation of human detritus.  
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 Agamben’s argument places bare life, paradigmatically represented by the 
Roman law figure of homo sacer, the sacred man, as the most important figure to 
Western politics.42 Crucially for Agamben’s argument, without bare life, political 
life, and more importantly the rights that constitute that political life, cannot 
ground itself, as it is bare life that gives political rights their meaning.43 
 Agamben’s attempt to inquire into an immanent life, which would in his 
terms deactivate this biopolitical machine, is strongly influenced by his reading of 
the late Foucault. However, this reading of Foucault is itself idiosyncratic and 
draws heavily on the influence of Gilles Deleuze. Agamben reads Deleuze as 
sharing both a “secret solidarity” and a “legacy” with Foucault.44 Agamben has a 
record of reading Foucault idiosyncratically to pursue his own philosophical 
projects,45 but it is precisely this reading which allows Agamben to detail his 
conception of emancipatory politics. 
 In Agamben’s reading of Foucault’s last essay: ‘Life: Experience and 
Science’, which he reads with Gilles Deleuze’s essay, ‘Immanence: A Life...’.46 
Agamben reads in Foucault’s text “a curious inversion of what had been 
Foucault’s earlier understanding of the idea of life”.47 This ‘earlier understanding’ 
refers to Foucault’s reading of Bichat in The Birth of the Clinic. Bichat placed life 
in opposition and exposure to death, contending that to understand disease it is 
necessary to take the point of view of death, which life, by definition, resists.48 
Taking on board Bichat’s definition of life as the totality of functions that resist 
death, Foucault contends that death provides the focal point for knowledge to give 
life its meaning – death is the opening on life’s truth.49  
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 It is this definition of ‘life’ which Deleuze, and, following him, Agamben 
sees as Foucault’s originary vitalism, seeing life as capacity to resist force and 
power.50 This is supported by Foucault’s comments regarding death being the 
limiting force on biopower, and his claims in The Order of Things in respect of 
nineteenth century thought that “life becomes a fundamental force” and an 
“untamed ontology”.51 It is this force that annihilates and overturns everything it 
confronts, in the form of a ruptural intervention.52  
 Building on this, Agamben reads Foucault as having changed his vitalist 
consideration of life to one where life is “the proper domain of error”.53 Certainly, 
Foucault himself wrote that the essay represented “a different way of approaching 
the notion of life”.54 Foucault writes: 
In a sense, life – and this is its radical feature – is that which is capable of 
error. ... [W]ith man, life has led to a living being that is never completely 
in the right place, that is destined to “err” and to be “wrong”.55 
 
Foucault continues, seemingly reversing his conclusion in The Order of Things: 
Should life be considered as nothing more than one of the areas that raises 
the general question of truth, the subject, and knowledge? Or does it 
oblige us to pose the question in a different way? Should not the whole 
theory of the subject be reformulated, seeing that knowledge, rather than 
opening onto the truth of the world, is deeply rooted in the “errors” of 
life?56 
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Agamben reads Foucault as opening up an unexplored terrain for questioning life, 
one which “coincides with the field of biopolitics”.57 This idea of life in Foucault 
sees its potential errors as being able to resist and counter the strategies of 
biopolitics, which carry within them the latent threat to “let die”, casting aside the 
individual for the benefit of the population.  
 It is precisely here, with Agamben’s pronouncement, that this biopolitical 
terrain offers two competing visions of emancipation. Agamben attempts to 
construct a vision of life and resistance as purely immanent. Contrarily, 
Foucault’s vision of life as error leads to resistance being experienced as a 
transcendent possibility for any living being. Transcendence here can be read as 
meaning beyond or outside, which here retains the possibility of going beyond the 
order of dispositifs and overcoming them. It is through analysing each writer’s use 
of the dispositif that this conclusion can be evidenced. 
 
III. The dispositif  
The dispositif structures how Agamben and Foucault conceive of life, and, by 
extension, death. A starting point can be found in Agamben’s claim that the 
dispositif is an “essential technical term” for Foucault which takes the place of 
universals (or, to use another vocabulary, the transcendent) within his work.58 
Foucault’s use of the dispositif occurred at a specific time in his thought. Jeffrey 
Bussolini traces the first extensive usage of the term in The History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1, which allows Foucault to elucidate his genealogical approach to 
history, evaluating a moving field of continuities predicated on continual 
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change.59 Both Graham Burchell and Bussolini note that Foucault distinguishes 
between dispositif and appareil, both of which get translated as ‘apparatus’.60 As 
Burchell notes, Foucault uses appareil to refer to State mechanisms of power.61 
This is deliberate. Bussolini contends that the terms are distinguishable because 
the Latin, French and Italian concepts of ‘apparatus’ support a peculiar meaning 
distinct from dispositif, namely a magnificent preparation, splendour, state, pomp 
and show.62 This ‘political theatricality’ of state apparatuses is evident in Foucault 
in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish.63 In an interview from 1977, 
Foucault defined the dispositif as follows: 
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Secondly, what I 
am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the 
connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thirdly, 
I understand by the term “apparatus” [dispositif] a sort of—shall we say—
formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment 
that of responding to an urgent need.64 
 
The dispositif named the network of power that articulated how a power that was 
not based upon a monist conception of sovereignty manifested itself. This network 
of relations between elements that responds to an emergency and which organizes, 
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enables, orients fixes and blocks relations of force.65 As Foucault stated, “power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation” and “power in the 
substantive sense, ‘le’ pouvoir, doesn’t exist”.66 Foucault’s network of dispositifs 
is not the totality of the relationships it gathers under it, but it exists only in 
relation to the object of its analysis.  
 Foucault’s approach to the dispositif is inextricably linked to his view of 
the subject. The human being is constituted as a subject by power relations and 
dispositifs,67 which define an area of experience that manifests itself in and 
through the mutually constitutive interrelationships among discourses, power 
relationships and relationships of the self, as well as in the different practices and 
systems involved in those relationships. In this sense, the dispositif operates as a 
transcendent referent for the subject, organizing the field of power and knowledge 
as a field of experience.68 Despite these dispositifs having a productive force, in 
that they are responsible for the creation of subjectivity and the ordering of lives, 
the nature of biopolitics means that those self-same dispositifs also have a 
negative side, in that they control and order which lives are worth preserving and 
which are not. Foucault’s thought seeks to break free of this negative logic of the 
dispositif.  
 Despite Foucault tracing a genealogy of the dispositif to the modern age, 
coinciding with the development of biopolitics and governmentality, Agamben 
reads a much longer history to the term. It is this difference in their readings 
which undergirds their views on resistance. Agamben also considers the dispositif 
as a transcendent referent, but traces the root of dispositif to the Latin dispositio, 
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translated the Greek word oikonomia, or economy.69 In his writings on the 
Christian pastorate, Foucault refers to Gregory of Nazianus, who speaks of an 
oikonomia psychōn, an ‘economy of souls’.70 Foucault traced the root of 
oikonomia to the Greek oikos, or household, and notes the managerial sense of the 
word.71 However, he contended that the term should be translated as ‘conduct’, in 
the sense of leading and a form of behaviour. Agamben claims that Foucault, in 
this move, misses an opportunity to complete his analysis of the dispositif because 
he chooses not to connect it to an economic theology which has been operative 
since the Early Christian Church.  
 The economical government of men and the world, found today in 
biopolitics and liberal economic government, can be traced to the problem of the 
Christian Trinity, and the question of how to resolve a monotheistic faith with the 
triune nature of God.72 St Paul described the relationship between God, Christ and 
the Holy Spirit as the oikonomia of the mystery, namely an activity which will 
reveal the Divine mystery, God’s plan.73 Agamben reads the Early Church 
Fathers, including Irenaeus, Tertullian and Hippolytus as ultimately reversing the 
Pauline syntagma into the mystery of oikonomia, a mystery of the economy.74 The 
crucial point to be grasped here is that this reversal resolves the mystery not 
through an ontological means, but by an economic-governmental one, which 
emphasizes its praxis.75 God is to be thought not through the being of the Trinity, 
but through its praxis, through the administration of His Divine plan on Earth. 
The mystery of the Trinity is to be revealed through the stewardship of the 
Earth.76  
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 For Agamben, God’s transcendent sovereignty is administered through his 
immanent government of the Earth. This chimes with Foucault’s use of dispositif 
as emphasizing the active setting in order and management which characterizes 
government.77 However, Agamben remarks that it is with Origen that oikonomia 
gains a meaning of a providential unfolding of history according to an 
eschatological design, so that this mysterious economy is endowed with a sense of 
meaning and direction.78 The notion of oikonomia posits a transcendent freedom, 
effected through economic governance and dispositifs, which corresponds to a 
Divine design.  
 Agamben’s method focuses not upon exhaustive descriptions but upon 
singular paradigms which stand as examples of parts of our present, enabling him 
to make intelligible a broader “historical-problematic context”.79 For Agamben, 
the machinery of modernity has inherited this paradigm of the internal logic of the 
Trinity and deployed it in a biopolitical government which is nothing other than 
the art of exercising power, through dispositifs, in the form of a liberal economy.80 
In a similar vein, connecting biopolitics to neoliberal economics more explicitly 
than Agamben, Maurizio Lazzarato has argued that debt has become central to 
liberal economics, and operates as a dispositif of control which produces and 
governs subjects.81 The providential ordering of the world through economic 
government ensures freedom, but this freedom is actually only bios. Agamben’s 
riposte is that such a bipolar machine, hovering between transcendent and 
immanent poles, will always produce a remainder, the bare life swept away by the 
tide of progress. Government is what emerges when desubjects, individuals with 
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no rights at the mercy of power, and not subjects, are produced by the network of 
dispositifs Agamben terms oikonomia.82  
 So how can we summarize this analysis of the dispositif? Foucault wished 
to cut off the King’s head in political theory.83 From this, Foucault makes the 
claim that, “the King reigns but does not govern”, precisely because government, 
and a politics of populations, has become preeminent in modernity.84 Foucault 
replaces and subsuming sovereignty with dispositifs of governmentality and 
biopower, which structure and delimit the subject. Crucially, this transcendent 
dispositif constructs genealogies of regimes of power, which opens a space for 
questioning by showing that our understanding of ourselves need not be 
dominated and defined by power. In short, the dispositif shows us that resistance 
is always possible, and that power is never totalizing. 
 The important difference with Agamben is his situating Foucault’s 
pastorate and governmentality in an economic paradigm, where sovereign 
decision-making is effected through an oikonomia, and dispositifs of control. He 
openly abandons the context of Foucauldian philology in order to situate the 
dispositif in a new context.85 Specifically, Agamben views the dispositif in a much 
more totalizing manner: 
Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian dispositives, I 
shall call an dispositive literally anything that has in some way the 
capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure 
the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not 
only, therefore, prisons, mad houses, the panopticon, schools, confession, 
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factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection 
with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, 
literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, 
cellular telephones and – why not – language itself, which is perhaps the 
most ancient of apparatuses.86 
 
Therefore Agamben proposes a massive (in his own words) division: on the one 
hand, living beings, and on the other, dispositifs in which living beings are 
incessantly captured: 
To recapitulate, we have then two great classes: living beings (or 
substances) and dispositives, and between these two, as a third class, 
subjects. I call a subject that which results from the relation and, so to 
speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and dispositives.87 
 
Agamben’s subject is produced and utterly dominated by dispositifs. Contrary to 
Foucault, this power is totalizing, precisely because of the operation of the 
oikonomic governmental machine. As such, it is not possible for a subject to 
escape the control of the dispositif, or to utilize the dispositif to construct a form 
of freedom which transcends the individual. It is this eschewing of transcendence 
which leaves Agamben to conclude only a philosophy of immanence can counter 
this threat.  
 
IV. Foucault and the Possibilities of Transcendence 
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Foucault made the point that his books were written for ‘users’, not ‘readers’, and 
that he stated that he wanted his books to be a “tool-box” for action, has led to a 
multitude of interpretations and readings of Foucault’s thought.88 This article 
adopts such a ‘tool-box’ approach in illustrating that it is possible to read 
resistance to power as a transcendent possibility in Foucault.  
 The starting point for such a reading is a 1982 interview, in which 
Foucault claimed that resistance, rather than power, was the key force in the social 
order.89 It is this statement which led Deleuze to read Foucault as positing 
resistance as being an unconfinable element prior to power.90 Resistance comes 
first, and remains superior to power relations, which are obliged to change in the 
face of that resistance.91 Whilst the minimum form of resistance is saying “no”, 
Foucault sees resistance not as mere negation, but as a creative process. 
Resistance actively changes the strategic situation which subjects find themselves 
in with respect to power relations and dispositifs.92 Foucault’s thought can be read 
as showing the individual as both effected by and effecting power relations. The 
dispositifs of control both define us, and provide us the opportunity to break free 
of them at the same time. Power relations themselves depend upon resistance, 
which is never ‘exterior’ to power.93 Rather, a plurality of resistances is inscribed 
in power as an “irreducible opposite”.94  
 Despite this focus upon resistance, Foucault held reservations for the 
politics of what I term ‘mere’ resistance, and cautioned against the equating of 
resistance with liberation. Decisively, Foucault distinguishes ‘freedom’ from 
‘liberation’. Whilst admitting that liberation does exist, for example in the 
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colonial setting, Foucault makes clear that liberation is not sufficient to define the 
practices of freedom needed for individuals to define “admissible and acceptable 
forms of existence or political society”.95 Liberation is used to refer to forms of 
resistance to domination that release a pre-existing identity from an oppressive 
external force.96 Freedom bears essentially on relations of power and domination 
– liberation from domination only gives way to new power relationships, which 
must be controlled by practices of freedom.97  
 It is these practices of freedom which allows the subject to practice self-
construction and in turn, resist and rework the dispositifs that constitute them. 
‘Mere’ resistance to power, like liberation, has the drawback of emerging in 
reaction to oppression and domination by dispositifs of control.98 As such it is 
likely to create an attachment to an identity which is formed through that 
oppression, and therefore will reinforce those self-same dominating biopolitical 
dispositifs.99 More fundamentally, due to the spectre of biopolitics and the latent 
role of dispositifs in ‘letting die’, such a resistance and attempt to escape the 
dispositif will only, almost paradoxically, end up repeating its logic of deciding 
and regulating life and death. This is why Foucault sees power, and the dispositif, 
as imposing on the subject “a law of truth ... which he must recognise and which 
others have to recognise in him”.100 Instead, the practice of freedom is a ‘limit-
experience’: 
The idea of a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself is 
what was important to me ... however erudite my books may be, I’ve 
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always conceived of them as direct experiences aimed at pulling myself 
free of myself, at preventing me from being the same.101 
 
Following this theme, we can read Foucault in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ as 
supporting the claim that this practice of freedom should be considered as a way 
of being:  
We must obviously give a more positive content to what may be a 
philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, 
thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves … This 
philosophical ethos may be characterised as a limit-attitude … We have to 
move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the 
frontiers.102  
 
The politics of liberation is not enough to guarantee freedom, as freedom is not 
mere resistance to power. Freedom is the careful and innovative deployment of 
power, and by extension, dispositifs, in the effort to constitute the free self. In 
other words, the dispositif is needed to constitute the ethos of freedom: 
I do not think that a society can exist without power relations … The 
problem, then, is ... to acquire the rules of law, the management 
techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of the self, that 
will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible.103 
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This game of power is agonistic. There is no ‘essential freedom’ to be found, but 
a ‘permanent provocation’ between the self and the dispositifs of power 
relations.104 The key task is to “refuse what we are”, to “promote new forms of 
subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries”.105 The creation of new forms of subjectivity 
involves freedom as a practice which requires the subject to self-create themselves 
anew, taking into account the dispositifs which constrain and control, and 
enabling the individual to discern the types of actions and interventions that are 
needed to effect change and create new subjectivities.  
 Freedom connects the dispositif and what is always beyond, the ‘outside’. 
It is here that the connection can be made to Foucault’s last essay, and his view of 
error as the proper domain of life. When Foucault writes that life is that which is 
destined to err, we can conclude that such a life contains the possibility to 
transcend dispositifs and break free of the logic of deciding who should live and 
who should be left to die. Freedom is experienced at the limit of power relations 
through their transgression, their erring, which is always-already a possibility, or 
destiny, for individuals to enact:  
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of 
being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely 
uncrossable and reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely 
crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows.106 
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The act of freedom constitutes itself through acting at the limit of the dispositif, 
transgressing that limit, erring, calling out to thought from the limit of the network 
of power relations, creating new subjectivities through the very response of the 
dispositifs to those transgressive acts. The dispositif thus controls life, but also is 
required for freedom in the form of self-creation. Crucially for this argument, this 
transgressive freedom which brings about the self-creation of the new is a 
transcendent possibility, which the individual effects and which power relations 
and dispositifs must react to in response to these creative acts.  
 This is why Deleuze spoke of this kind of self-relation as the ‘folding’ of 
power relations back upon themselves. It is not possible to move ‘outside’ of the 
totalizing dispositif in terms of liberation. However, it is possible to think from the 
outside, from the limit, in a manner which brings together both the ‘inside’ of the 
dispositif and the ‘outside’, of which the dispositif is an operation. As Deleuze 
states: 
The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by 
peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: 
they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of 
the outside … The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work 
Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the 
fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea.107   
 
In acting on the individual, dispositifs produce an ‘inside’ as an “interiorisation of 
the outside”.108 This folding allows a subject to differentiate itself from dispositifs 
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and no longer has an internal dependence upon them – for Deleuze reading 
Foucault, there will always be a relation to oneself that resists such dispositifs.109 
The individual has the potential to distance themselves from the dispositifs that 
create our identity. This folding of power relations opens a space for the 
individual to transgress.  
 The question remains as to precisely how this transcendent transgressive 
freedom is effected. Foucault did write of the need to bring about a “historical 
ontology of ourselves”,110 such a questioning of current modes of existence does, 
on a certain reading, suggest that if we discovered the reality about how power 
operates in this world the individual can break free of its chains.111 This view 
comes close to a Marxist view of ‘false consciousness’, and ignores the agonistic 
element to this reading of Foucault.112 
 Rather, following Aurelia Armstrong, I draw upon comments suggesting 
that it is only under the pressure of an event which makes our present identity and 
control problematic that we are forced to exercise our freedom.113 Foucault 
suggests the following:  
[F]or a domain of action, a behaviour to enter the field of thought, it is 
necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to 
have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of 
difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, or 
political processes … their role is instigation.114 
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These transgressions or errors of life, of action, and of existing, are the 
transcendent experience of events which force a questioning of the current 
dispositifs controlling the reality we inhabit. These errors allow the individual to 
interiorize the outside, and practice freedom as a transgressive limit-experience, 
agonistically questioning and forcing dispositifs to react to new subjectivities. 
These events do not have to be epochal, or revolutionary.115 As Foucault states, 
different processes can instigate this process – the key is that it is the individual 
who responds to such instigation and practices this freedom through their actions 
and errors, causing the very conception of life to be changed through an 
“experimental mode of inquiry”.116  
 
V. Agamben’s immanent life 
Agamben makes clear his scepticism towards this Foucauldian idea of 
transgressive freedom. Agamben can be read as seeing the ‘necessary illusion’ of 
transcendence as re-entering Foucault’s thought, through the notion of freedom. 
He makes clear that creating new subjectivities will not affect the oikonomic 
governmental machine:  
Just as the biopolitical body of the West cannot be simply given back to its 
natural life in the oikos, so it cannot be overcome in a passage to a new 
body ... in which a different economy of pleasures and vital functions 
would once and for all resolve the interlacement of zoē and bios that seems 
to define the political destiny of the West.117 
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Foucault’s life lived through a transgressive freedom does not go far enough for 
Agamben; it still has recourse to a transcendent referent, in the form of a practice 
of freedom that dispositifs respond to and inevitably attempt to order and control. 
In this manner, sovereignty, through the ordering of an oikonomic government, 
recovers the ability to decide upon which lives are worth living and which lives 
are bare life, homo sacer. The dispositif will always totalize as long as life itself 
holds itself out to be defined by something other than itself, which is what it does 
when it relies on the logic of transcendence. This is why a politics of rupture and 
language of ‘overcoming’ is unsatisfactory. Politics will only begin with the 
“inoperative disarticulation of both bios and zoē”.118 Only in this manner, through 
this rendering inoperative, which Agamben equates to a messianic move, will the 
thanatopolitics Agamben sees at the heart of today’s biopolitical world be 
countered.119 The task Agamben sets himself is by no means straightforward – 
Deleuze and Guattari describe it bluntly: 
Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE 
plane of immanence as to show it is there, unthought in every plane, and 
to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-
external outside and the not-internal inside.120  
 
The only resistance which is effective against the totalizing power of the dispositif 
is the construction of a form-of-life, a life which is lived immanently and 
therefore not reliant upon dispositifs to be constituted, nor any form of 
transcendence. Form-of-life, termed ‘whatever-Being’ by Agamben, shows that 
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humanity always has the possibility of redemption beyond biopolitics, and that 
living beings can resist domination.121  
 The Coming Community opens with a meditation upon the relationship 
between universals and particulars by using ‘whatever-Being’.122 The whatever is 
not indifference seen from the point of view of the universal, where all 
particularities (subjects) are of indifferent importance with respect to the universal 
(the dispositif) that gives them their meaning. Agamben rejects the idea that only 
universals provide us with the means of understanding particular cases, and the 
idea that without them we would find ourselves lost amid a world of nameless 
singularities. Rather, the whatever is a radical indifference.  
 The singularity of whatever-Being no longer needs to ground itself in an 
‘outside’, be that a political order, dispositif or identity, or a transgressive 
freedom, in order to be fulfilled. This immanent life is a singularity, conceived of 
in all its rich difference from other singularities, a form-of-life. Whatever-being is 
a being freed from the dilemma of the universal and particular; it “remains 
constantly hidden in the condition of belonging”.123 This form-of-life, where bare 
life cannot be placed in a state of sacred separation or exception, is one where bios 
would coincide with zoē. Form-of-life is life lived in its own potentiality of “being 
thus”, on the plane of immanence itself.124 Such a life is one which does not rely 
upon the dispositif, or a transcendent transgression at its limit. The impact of this 
sketch of a singular, immanent life can be shown through a quote from Jean-Luc 
Nancy, another thinker of singularity: 
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The singular being is neither the common being nor the individual … 
There is no singular being: there is, and this is different, an essential 
singularity of being itself ... That is to say, the “singular being” is not a 
kind of being among beings. In a sense, every being is absolutely singular 
... But the singularity of being … is singular on the basis of the limit that 
exposes it … which is itself diverse.125 
 
Such a life cannot be based upon the mutual sharing of properties. Form-of-life 
cannot form a politics of social movements.126 As Roberto Esposito has explained, 
‘personhood’ is one of the most widely accepted concepts in law, bioethics and 
politics today, yet the idea of the ‘person’ is a dispositif which welds together 
man’s animality and his political being, in a manner akin to Agamben’s bios.127 
As identity politics today is presaged on the idea of personhood, this immanent 
thinking of life must not be in any way connected to current ideas of identity in 
order to avoid repeating them. A community of forms-of-life is not structured by 
an absence of shared properties. If it was it would be a “negative community”.128 
The coming community must be a community of singularities who share nothing 
more than their singularity, their being-such.  
 Agamben accepts that it is not possible to think of existence and a 
community beyond all relation, but the relationality that exists for form-of-life is 
of a different kind than that produced by dispositifs such as the law. In Nudities he 
claims: 
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The desire to be recognised by others is inseparable from being human. 
Indeed, such recognition is so essential that, according to Hegel, everyone 
is ready to put his or her own life in jeopardy in order to obtain it. This is 
not merely a question of satisfaction or self-love; rather, it is only through 
recognition by others that man can constitute himself as a person.129  
 
However, form-of-life is a “new figure of the human” that is “beyond personal 
identity”.130 What this formulation implies is that the foundations of immanent life 
are ungraspable through presuppositions, transcendent resistance or the dispositif. 
What does this mean for the prospect of resistance? 
 There is no easy answer to what a politics of radical indifference would 
entail. For Agamben, resistance to the controlling power of dispostifs is a question 
of ontology, rather than one of politics. That this task is urgent is clear, yet it is in 
the here and now that resistance must be found. One clue to the nature of this 
indifference can be found in an interview in 1999, where Agamben was asked 
why, when he clearly identifies the adversaries we have to face today, his 
response is to take flight and evade, rather than to stand up and resist.131 In this 
manner, Agamben stands apart from the agonism of Foucault detailed above. He 
answered: 
I think everything depends on what one understands by flight … The 
notion of flight does not imply an elsewhere one might go. No, it’s a very 
particular flight: a flight with no elsewhere … For me, it’s a question of 
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thinking a flight which would not imply evasion: a movement on the spot, 
in the situation itself.132 
 
The resistance to the dispositif is already in the world. We are not waiting for a 
revolutionary event, but rather to ignore the need to progress and actualize a better 
world. Specifically, this is a call to be radically indifferent towards the dispositifs 
which structure and delimit our existence. Given the breadth of Agamben’s 
formulation of the dispositif, this is an impossible task, given he includes language 
as one such dispositif. This resistance to oikonomic government does not mean the 
utter rejection and removal of all dispositifs, or their overturning. Rather, this 
resistance is a withdrawal from the oikonomic system, and the leading of a life 
that would not accept the logic of dispositifs. Such a life would render those 
dispositifs of control inoperative. This can be read as a form of resistance itself.133 
As Juliane Schiffers explained: 
Man is a being who not only has the potential to realise and relate to his 
own being but also to realise and to relate to the contingency, 
inaccessibility and instability of his being.134 
 
The key is to “think an Ungovernable”, which is a life that is neither a 
revolutionary subject, nor able to be captured by the dispositif.135 The 
Ungovernable is “the beginning and, at the same time, the vanishing point of 
every politics”.136 Agamben uses a number of quixotic and esoteric exemplars to 
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illustrate this life, from the nude body,137 to Bartleby the Scrivener,138 to the 
protestors in Tiananmen Square.139 
 Perhaps the most fruitful and useful exposition of this form-of-life can be 
found in the collective life of Franciscan monasticism. This illustrates a life linked 
so closely to its form that it proves to be inseparable from it.140 In contrast to a 
regulated monastic life, the Franciscan Order attempted to integrate monastic 
rules into a form of life itself, by living according to the “form of the Holy 
Gospel”.141 This was not reducible to a normative code, so rule and life became 
indistinguishable.142 Service to God and the life lead by the Franciscan monk is 
one and the same. Monasticism stands as a life lived alongside all of the 
dispositifs which structure and create subjects. As the monks did not, however, 
define their existence through outside referents, the dispositifs which existed did 
not define them as subjects, and so had no control over them. They had rendered 
them inoperative.  
 In this way, a life lived as its own form works on existing subjects to other 
them. Such a life defines its own way of living, to other itself, just as the 
Franciscan Order chose to. The monastic rules which were laid down by the 
Church did not govern the community, but the practice of living in common and 
the rules which were needed to sustain the common life were mutually 
reinforcing.143 For the Franciscans, the laws and rules still existed, and mutually 
reinforced the life being led, but the individual monks chose not to use the 
methods of the laws and rules. Instead, they were aware of them and used them in 
a different, new manner.144 The common life of the monk is held in a negative 
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nonrelation to the law and the rules (in our terms, the dispositif): the existences of 
those dispositifs are necessary to differentiate the form-of-life the monks are 
practicing. They do not order and respond to a transgression in Foucault’s terms, 
but remain apart from this life, as there is nothing in this life which they can gain 
purchase on and control.  
 Once again, this form of resistance is a practice, but not one akin to 
Foucault’s freedom. Agamben’s analysis exhorts us to undertake a “radical 
rethinking”, to borrow Esposito’s terms, of the idea of being human.145 He is clear 
that any idea of politics cannot even be raised as long as individuals are unable to 
intervene in the processes of subjectification caused by the dispositifs of today.146 
Yet it is precisely here that Agamben notes that despite the pervasive nature of 
dispositifs, there will remain an “elusive element” which escapes the grasp of 
oikonomic government the more it docilely submits to it. Although Agamben 
questions whether such docility can “even threaten the governmental machine”, it 
is with this spectre that hope for the future lies.147  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The dispositif can be seen to stand as the site for how Agamben and Foucault 
conceive of resistance. For Foucault, the dispositifs of control which exist in the 
world are never totalizing, and there is always room for resistance and revolt. 
Crucially, such resistance embraces those same dispositifs, utilizing its existence 
to act at the limit and create a new space for human activity. For Agamben, such 
dispositifs of control are completely totalizing. As a result, any resistance must be 
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evasive in character and ultimately involves thinking an immanent life. Whilst 
Foucault offers concrete ideas, Agamben appears to evade and avoid such notions. 
However, whereas Foucault’s resistance appears grounded in the tradition of 
critical theory, Agamben offers an ontological solution to the world’s ills. 
Although Agamben is influenced by Foucault’s thought, his way forward is 
markedly divergent. The choice offered here is a clear one: should leftist thought 
conceive of modes of resistance politically, or ontologically? The debate 
continues.  
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